# electric-NCP.mod # # NCP formulation of EPEC derived from MPECs defined in AllFirms.mod # # MPEC of example due to Fukushima and Pang, "Quasi-Variational # Inequalities, Nash-Equilibria, and Multi-Leader-Follower Games". # # The generator (firm) is the Stackelberg leader, and the ISO, # arbitrager, and market clearing are the followers in this game. # Another possibility is to have the ISO as a Leader as well. # # ampl coding by S. Leyffer, Argonne National Laboratory, Jan. 2005. # # Change log: # ####################################################################### ### set definitions set N; # set of nodes in network set F; # set of firms (generators) set ARCS in N cross N; ### parameters & constants param c{F,N} default 0; # cost per unit generation at node n by firm f param P0{N}; # price intercept of sales function at node n param Q0{N}; # quatity intercept of sales function at node n param e{ARCS}; # ISO's unit cost of shipping along arcs param CAP{F,N}; # production capacity at node n for firm f ### variables var s{F,ARCS} >= 0; # amount produced by f at node n1, sold at n2 var y{ARCS} >= 0; # amount of shipment from n1 to n2 var S{N} >= 0; # total sales at node n var ss{ARCS} >= 0; # slacks for easier complementarity var a{ARCS} >= 0; # amount bought by arbitrager at n1, sold at n2 var w{ARCS} default 1; # unit charge of shipment received by ISO ### multipliers (each firm has different multipliers) var l_cap{F,N} >= 0; # capacity constraint var l_sal{F,N}; # total sales var l_slk{F,ARCS}; # definition of slacks var l_arb{F,ARCS} >= 0; # arbitrager var l_mar{F,ARCS}; # market clearing var l_ISO{F,ARCS} >= 0; # ISO minimize dummy: 0; subject to ### first order equations wrt s[f,i,j] FO_s {f in F, (i,j) in ARCS}: 0 <= - (P0[j] - P0[j]/Q0[j]*S[j]) + w[i,j] + c[f,i] + l_cap[f,i] - l_sal[f,j] - l_mar[f,i,j] complements s[f,i,j] >= 0; ### first order equations wrt y[i,j] for every leader f FO_y {f in F, (i,j) in ARCS}: 0 <= l_mar[f,i,j] + l_ISO[f,i,j]*(-w[i,j]+e[i,j]) complements y[i,j] >= 0; ### first order equations wrt S[i] for every leader f FO_S {f in F, i in N}: 0 <= P0[i]/Q0[i]*(sum{j in N: (j,i) in ARCS}(s[f,j,i]+a[j,i]-a[i,j])) + l_sal[f,i] + sum{j in N:(j,i) in ARCS} l_slk[f,j,i]*(P0[i]/Q0[i]) - sum{j in N:(i,j) in ARCS} l_slk[f,i,j]*(P0[i]/Q0[i]) complements S[i] >= 0; ### first order equations wrt ss[i,j] for every leader f FO_ss{f in F, (i,j) in ARCS}: 0 <= l_slk[f,i,j] + l_arb[f,i,j]*a[i,j] complements ss[i,j] >= 0; ### first order equations wrt a[i,j] for every leader f FO_a {f in F, (i,j) in ARCS}: 0 <= - (P0[j]-P0[j]/Q0[j]*S[j]) + (P0[i]-P0[i]/Q0[i]*S[i]) + w[i,j] - l_sal[f,j] + l_sal[f,i] + l_arb[f,i,j]*ss[i,j] - l_mar[f,i,j] complements a[i,j] >= 0; ### first order equations wrt w[i,j] for every leader f FO_w {f in F, (i,j) in ARCS}: 0 <= (a[i,j] + s[f,i,j]) - l_slk[f,i,j] - l_ISO[f,i,j]*y[i,j] complements w[i,j] <= e[i,j]; ### capacity constraint cap{f in F,i in N}: CAP[f,i] >= sum{j in N:(i,j) in ARCS} s[f,i,j] complements l_cap[f,i] >= 0; ### total sales at node i sales{i in N}: 0 = - S[i] + sum{f in F, j in N:(j,i) in ARCS} s[f,j,i] + sum{j in N:(i,j) in ARCS}( a[j,i] - a[i,j] ); ### define slacks for complementarity slacks{(i,j) in ARCS}: 0 = - ss[i,j] - (P0[j] - P0[j]/Q0[j]*S[j]) + (P0[i] - P0[i]/Q0[i]*S[i]) + w[i,j]; ### market clearing condition market{(i,j) in ARCS}: y[i,j] = sum{f in F} s[f,i,j] + a[i,j] complements w[i,j]; ### arbitrager's optimality conditions (follower) arbitrager{f in F, (i,j) in ARCS}: 0 <= -a[i,j]*ss[i,j] complements l_arb[f,i,j] >= 0; ### ISO's optimality conditions ISO{f in F, (i,j) in ARCS}: 0 <= -y[i,j]*(-w[i,j]+e[i,j]) complements l_ISO[f,i,j]>= 0;